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On the Computational Complexity of Model Checking
for Dynamic Epistemic Logic with S5 Models
Ronald de Haan · Iris van de Pol
Abstract Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a logical framework for represent-
ing and reasoning about knowledge change for multiple agents. An important
computational task in this framework is the model checking problem, which
has been shown to be PSPACE-hard even for S5 models and two agents. We
answer open questions in the literature about the complexity of this problem
in more restricted settings. We provide a detailed complexity analysis of the
model checking problem for DEL, where we consider various combinations of re-
strictions, such as the number of agents, whether the models are single-pointed
or multi-pointed, and whether postconditions are allowed in the updates. In
particular, we show that the problem is already PSPACE-hard in (1) the case
of one agent, multi-pointed S5 models, and no postconditions, and (2) the case
of two agents, only single-pointed S5 models, and no postconditions. In addi-
tion, we study the setting where only semi-private announcements are allowed
as updates. We show that for this case the problem is already PSPACE-hard
when restricted to two agents and three propositional variables.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic (or DEL, for short) is a logical framework for repre-
senting and reasoning about knowledge (and belief) change for multiple agents.
This framework has applications in philosophy, cognitive science, computer
science and artificial intelligence (see, e.g., [7,10,11,15,20,25]). For instance,
reasoning about information and knowledge change is an important topic for
multi-agent and distributed systems [16].
DEL is a very general and expressive framework, but many settings where
the framework is used allow strong restrictions. For instance, in the context
of reasoning about knowledge, the semantic models for the logic are often
restricted to models that contain only equivalence relations (also called S5
models).
For many of the applications of DEL, computational and algorithmic as-
pects of the framework are highly relevant. It is important to study the com-
plexity of computational problems associated with the logic to determine to
what extent it can be used in practical settings, and what algorithmic ap-
proaches are best suited to solve these problems. One important computational
task is the problem of model checking, where the question is to decide whether
a formula is true in a model.
The complexity of the model checking problem for DEL has been a topic
of investigation in the literature. For a restricted fragment of DEL, known as
public announcement logic [4,5,21], the model checking problem is polynomial-
time solvable [9,17]. The problem of DEL model checking, in its general form,
has been shown to be PSPACE-complete [2,14], even in the case of two agents
and S5 models. However, these hardness proofs crucially depend on the use
of multi-pointed models, and therefore do not apply for the case where the
problem is restricted to single-pointed S5 models. This open question was an-
swered with a PSPACE-hardness proof for the restricted case where all models
are single-pointed S5 models, but where the number of agents is unbounded
[23,24]. It remained open whether these PSPACE-hardness results extend to
more restrictive settings (e.g., only two agents and single-pointed S5 models).
Other Related Work Various topics related to DEL model checking have been
studied in the literature. For (several restricted variants of) a knowledge up-
date framework based on epistemic logic, the computational complexity of
the model checking problem has been investigated [6]. Other related work
includes implementations of algorithms for DEL model checking [8,13]. Addi-
tionally, research has been done on the complexity of the satisfiability problem
for (fragments of) DEL [2,19].
Contributions In this paper we provide a detailed computational complexity
analysis of the model checking problem for DEL, restricted to S5 models. We
consider various different restricted settings of this problem.
For the case of arbitrary event models, we have the following results.
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– We show that the problem is polynomial-time solvable in the case of a single
agent and single-pointed S5 models without postconditions (Proposition 1).
– We show that a similar restriction (single agent and single-pointed S5 mod-
els) where postconditions are allowed already leads to ∆p2-hardness (Theo-
rem 1).
– When multi-pointed event models are allowed, we show that the problem
is PSPACE-hard even for the case of a single agent and S5 models without
postconditions (Theorem 2).
– For the case where there are two agents, we show that the problem is
already PSPACE-hard when restricted to single-pointed S5 models without
postconditions and with only three propositional variables (Theorem 3).
An overview of the complexity results for arbitrary event models can be found
in Table 1.
Additionally, we consider the setting where instead of arbitrary event mod-
els, only semi-private announcements can be used—this is a restricted class of
event models. In this setting, the problem is known to be PSPACE-hard, when
an arbitrary number of agents is allowed (i.e., when the number of agents is
part of the problem input) [23, Theorem 4].
– We show that the problem is already PSPACE-hard in the case where there
are only two agents and only three propositional variables (Theorem 4).1
# agents single- or multi-pointed postconditions complexity
1 single no in P (Proposition 1)
1 single yes ∆p
2
-hard (Theorem 1)
1 multi no / yes PSPACE-complete (Theorem 2)
≥ 2 single / multi no / yes PSPACE-complete (Theorem 3)
Table 1: Complexity results for the model checking problem for DEL with S5
models and S5 event models.
Roadmap We begin in Section 2 with reviewing basic notions and notation
from dynamic epistemic logic and complexity theory. Then, in Section 3, we
present the complexity results for the various settings that involve updates
with (arbitrary) event models. In Section 4, we present our PSPACE-hardness
proof for the setting of semi-private announcements. Finally, we conclude and
suggest directions for future research in Section 5.
1 Theorem 4 is a stronger result than Theorem 3—Theorem 4 implies the result of Theo-
rem 3.
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2 Preliminaries
We briefly review some basic notions from dynamic epistemic logic and com-
plexity theory that are required for the complexity results that we present in
this paper.
2.1 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
We begin by reviewing the syntax and semantics of dynamic epistemic logic.
We consider a version of this logic that is often considered in the literature
(e.g., by Van Ditmarsch, Van der Hoek and Kooi [11]). After describing the
logic that we consider in this paper, we briefly relate it to other variants of
dynamic epistemic logic that have been considered in the literature.
We fix a countable set P of propositional variables, and a finite set A of
agents. We begin with introducing the basic language of epistemic logic, and
its semantics. The semantics of epistemic logic is based on a type of (Kripke)
structures called epistemic models. Epistemic models are structures that are
used to represent the agents’ knowledge about the world and about the other
agents’ knowledge.
Definition 1 (Epistemic models) An epistemic model is a tuple M =
(W,R, V ), where W is a non-empty set of worlds, R maps each agent a ∈ A to
a relation Ra ⊆W×W , and V : P → 2W is a function called a valuation. By a
slight abuse of notation, we write w ∈M for w ∈ W . We also write v ∈ Ra(w)
for vRaw. A single-pointed model is a pair (M, w) consisting of an epistemic
model M and a designated (or pointed) world w ∈ M. A multi-pointed model
is a pair (M,Wd) consisting of an epistemic model M and a subset Wd of
designated worlds.
Definition 2 (Basic epistemic language) The language LEL of epistemic
logic is defined as the set of formulas ϕ defined inductively as follows, where p
ranges over P and a ranges over A:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ.
The formula ⊥ is an abbreviation for p∧¬p, and the formula ⊤ is an abbrevi-
ation for ¬⊥. A formula of the form (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) abbreviates ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧¬ϕ2), and
a formula of the form (ϕ1 → ϕ2) abbreviates (¬ϕ1 ∨ϕ2). Moreover, a formula
of the form Kˆaϕ is an abbreviation for ¬Ka¬ϕ. We call formulas of the form p
or ¬p literals. We denote the set of all literals by Lit.
Intuitively, the formula Kaϕ expresses that ‘agent a knows that ϕ holds in
the current situation.’ Next, we define when a formula in the basic epistemic
language is true in a world of an epistemic model.
Definition 3 (Truth conditions for LEL) Given an epistemic model M =
(W,R, V ), we inductively define the relation |= ⊆ W × LEL as follows. For
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all w ∈W :
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff both M, w |= ϕ1 and M, w |= ϕ2
M, w |= Kaϕ iff for all v ∈ Ra(w), it holds that M, v |= ϕ
The statement M, w |= ϕ expresses that the formula ϕ is true in world w in
the model M.
The framework of dynamic epistemic logic extends the basic epistemic logic
with a notion of updates, that are based on another type of structures: event
models. These are used to represent the effects of an event on the world and
the knowledge of the agents.
Definition 4 (Event models) An event model is a tuple E = (E, S, pre, post),
where E is a non-empty and finite set of possible events, S maps each agent a ∈
A to a relation Sa ⊆ E×E, pre : E → LEL is a function that maps each event
to a precondition expressed in the epistemic language, and post : E → 2Lit is a
function that maps each event to a set of literals (not containing complemen-
tary literals)2. For convenience, we write ⊤ to denote an empty postcondition.
By a slight abuse of notation, we write e ∈ E for e ∈ E. A single-pointed event
model is a pair (E , e) consisting of an event model E and a designated (or
pointed) event e ∈ E . A multi-pointed event model is a pair (E , Ed) consisting
of an event model E and a subset Ed ⊆ E of designated events.
The language of dynamic epistemic logic extends the basic epistemic lan-
guage with update modalities.
Definition 5 (Dynamic epistemic language) The language LDEL of dy-
namic epistemic logic is defined as the set of formulas ϕ defined inductively as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | [E , e]ϕ | [E , Ed]ϕ,
where p ranges over P and a ranges over A, and where (E , e) and (E , Ed)
are single- and multi-pointed event models, respectively. A formula of the
form 〈E , e〉ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬[E , e]¬ϕ; we use a similar abbreviation 〈E , Ed〉ϕ
for updates with multi-pointed event models.
The effect of these event models is defined using the following notion of
product update.
Definition 6 (Product update) LetM = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model
and let E = (E, S, pre, post) be an event model. The product update of M by E
2 Alternatively, one can define postconditions using a function post : E ×P → LEL, (see,
e.g., [12]). The complexity results in this paper also hold when this alternative definition is
used.
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is the epistemic modelM⊗E = (W ′, R′, V ′) defined as follows, where p ranges
over P and a ranges over A:
W ′ = { (w, e) ∈W × E :M, w |= pre(e) }
R′a = { ((w, e), (w
′, e′)) ∈W ′ ×W ′ : wRaw
′ and eSae
′ }
V ′(p) = { (w, e) ∈W ′ : w ∈ V (p) and ¬p 6∈ post(e) } ∪
{ (w, e) ∈W ′ : p ∈ post(e) }
Next, we define when a formula in the dynamic epistemic language is true
in a world of an epistemic model.
Definition 7 (Truth conditions for LDEL) Given an epistemic modelM =
(W,R, V ) and a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL, we inductively define the relation |= ⊆
W × LDEL as follows. For all w ∈W :
M, w |= [E , e]ϕ iff M, w |= pre(e) implies M⊗E , (w, e) |= ϕ
M, w |= [E , Ed]ϕ iff M, w |= [E , e]ϕ for all e ∈ Ed
The other cases are identical to Definition 3. Again, the statement M, w |= ϕ
expresses that the formula ϕ is true in state w in the model M.
(Having defined the languageLDEL, we could now also change the definition
of preconditions in event models to be functions pre : E → LDEL mapping
events to formulas in the dynamic epistemic language LDEL. The definition of
product update would work in an entirely similar way. All results in this paper
work for either definition of preconditions pre.)
We can then define truth of a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL in epistemic models as fol-
lows. A formula ϕ is true in a single-pointed epistemic model (M, w) ifM, w |=
ϕ, and a formula ϕ is true in a multi-pointed epistemic model (M,Wd) ifM, w |=
ϕ for all w ∈ Wd.
For the purposes of representing knowledge, the relations in epistemic mod-
els and event models are often restricted to be equivalence relations, that is,
reflexive, transitive and symmetric (see, e.g., [11]). Models that satisfy these
requirements are also called S5 models, after the axiomatic system that char-
acterizes this type of relations. In the remainder of this paper, we consider
only epistemic models and event models that are S5 models. All our hardness
results hold for S5 models, as well as for arbitrary models.
For the sake of convenience, we will often depict epistemic models and event
models graphically. We will represent worlds with solid dots, events with solid
squares, designated worlds and events with a circle or square around them,
valuations, preconditions and postconditions with labels next to the dots, and
relations with labelled lines between the dots. Since we restrict ourselves to
S5 models, and thus to equivalence relations, all relations are symmetric and
it suffices to represent relations with undirected lines. Moreover, the reflexive
relations are not represented graphically. For a valuation of a world w, we use
the literals that the valuation makes true in world w as a label, and for the pre-
conditions and postconditions of an event e, we use the label 〈pre(e), post(e)〉.
Moreover, since all epistemic models and event models that we consider in
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this paper have reflexive relations, in order not to clutter the graphical repre-
sentation of models, we do not explicitly depict the reflexive relations. For an
example of an epistemic model with its graphical representation, see Figure 1,
and for an example of an event model with its graphical representation, see
Figure 2.
z
w1
¬z
w2
a
Fig. 1: The epistemic model (M, w1) for the set A = {a, b} of agents
and a single proposition z, where M = (W,R, V ), W = {w1, w2}, Ra =
{(w1, w1), (w1, w2), (w2, w1), (w2, w2)}, Rb = {(w1, w1), (w2, w2)}, and V (z) =
{w1}.
〈⊤, h〉
e1
〈⊤,¬h〉
e2
a
Fig. 2: The event model (E , e1) for the set A = {a, b} of agents
and a single proposition h, where M = (E, S, pre, post), E = {e1, e2},
Ra = {(e1, e1), (e1, e2), (e2, e1), (e2, e2)}, Rb = {(e1, e1), (e2, e2)}, pre(e1) =
pre(e2) = ⊤, post(e1) = h, and post(e2) = ¬h.
A particular type of S5 event models that has been considered in the lit-
erature are semi-private (or semi-public) announcements [3]. Intuitively, a
semi-private announcement publicly announces one of two formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 to
a subset A of agents, and to the remaining agents it publicly announces that
one of the two formulas is the case, and that the agents in A learned which
one is. A semi-private announcement for formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 and a subset A ⊆ A
of agents is represented by the event model in Figure 3.
To illustrate the notion of semi-private announcements, consider the fol-
lowing example scenario. There are two agents, Ayla (a) and Blair (b). Ayla
flips a coin, which lands either on heads (h) or on tails (¬h), and hides the
result of the coin flip from Blair. Blair sees that the coin is flipped and that
Ayla knows the result of the coin flip, but Blair herself does not see the result
of the coin flip. This semi-private announcement is represented by the event
model E that is depicted in Figure 2 (in the event model depicted in Figure 2,
the coin lands on heads).
Relations to other variants of Dynamic Epistemic Logic The formalism of
dynamic epistemic logic that we consider is based on the one originally in-
troduced by Baltag, Moss, and Solecki [4,5]. Their language only considers
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〈ϕ1,⊤〉 〈ϕ2,⊤〉
A\A
Fig. 3: A semi-private announcement for formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 and the subset A ⊆ A
of agents.
single-pointed event models. A few years later, Baltag and Moss [3] extended
this original language to include regular operators (union, composition and
‘star’) for the update modalities. The language that we consider corresponds
to the variant of their language with only the union operator. The language
presented by Van Ditmarsch et al. in their textbook [11] resembles the lan-
guage that we consider, as their framework also allows the union operator
for updates, but not the composition or ‘star’ operators. The union opera-
tor for update modalities corresponds to allowing multi-pointed event models.
Because it simplifies notation, we use multi-pointed models, following the no-
tation of other existing work [10]. Additionally, the language that we consider
also allows events to have postconditions, unlike the language presented by
Van Ditmarsch et al. [11].
2.2 Computational Complexity
Next, we review some basic notions from computational complexity that are
used in the proofs of the results that we present. We assume the reader to
be familiar with the complexity classes P and NP, and with basic notions
such as polynomial-time reductions. For more details, we refer to textbooks
on computational complexity theory (see, e.g., [1]).
The class PSPACE consists of all decision problems that can be solved by
an algorithm that uses a polynomial amount of space (memory). Alternatively,
one can characterize the class PSPACE as all decision problems for which there
exists a polynomial-time reduction to the problemQSat, that is defined using
quantified Boolean formulas as follows. A (fully) quantified Boolean formula
(in prenex form) is a formula of the formQ1x1Q2x2 . . .Qnxn.ψ, where all xi are
propositional variables, eachQi is either an existential or a universal quantifier,
and ψ is a (quantifier-free) propositional formula over the variables x1, . . . , xn.
Truth for such formulas is defined in the usual way. The problemQSat consists
of deciding whether a given quantified Boolean formula is true. Moreover,
QSat is PSPACE-hard even when restricted to the case where Qi = ∃ for
odd i and Qi = ∀ for even i. (For the proofs of Theorems 2, 3 and 4, we will
use reductions from this restricted variant of QSat.)
Additionally, one can restrict the number of quantifier alternations occur-
ring in quantified Boolean formulas, i.e., the number of times where Qi 6= Qi+1.
For each constant k ≥ 1 number of alternations, this leads to a different com-
plexity class. These classes together constitute the Polynomial Hierarchy. We
consider the complexity classes Σpk , for each k ≥ 1. The complexity class Σ
p
k
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consists of all decision problems for which there exists a polynomial-time reduc-
tion to the problem QSatk. Instances of QSatk are quantified Boolean formu-
las of the form ∃x1 . . .∃xℓ1∀xℓ1+1 . . . ∀xℓ2 . . . Qkxℓk−1+1 . . . Qkxℓk . ψ, whereQk =
∃ if k is odd and Qk = ∀ if k is even, where 1 ≤ ℓ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ℓk, and where ψ
is quantifier-free. The question is to decide whether the quantified Boolean
formula is true.
The last complexity class that we consider is ∆p2 . We give a definition of
this class that is based on algorithms with access to an oracle, i.e., a black box
that is able to decide certain decision problems in a single operation. Consider
the problem Sat of deciding satisfiability of a given propositional formula. The
class ∆p2 consists of all decision problems that can be solved by a polynomial-
time algorithm with access to an oracle for Sat. Alternatively, the class ∆p2
consists of all decision problems for which there exists a polynomial-time re-
duction to the problem where one is given a satisfiable propositional formula ϕ
over the variables x1, . . . , xn, and the question is whether the lexicographically
maximal assignment that satisfies ϕ (given the fixed ordering x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xn)
sets variable xn to true [18]. An assignment α1 is lexicographically larger
than an assignment α2 (given the ordering x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xn) if there exists
some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that α1(xi) = 1, α2(xi) = 0, and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i it holds
that α1(xj) = α2(xj).
3 Results for updates with arbitrary S5 models
In this section, we provide complexity results for the model checking problem
for DEL when arbitrary event models are allowed for the update modalities in
the formulas. For several cases, we prove PSPACE-hardness. Since the problem
was recently shown to be in PSPACE for the most general variant of dynamic
epistemic logic that we consider in this paper [2,23,24], these hardness results
suffice to show PSPACE-completeness.
3.1 Polynomial-time solvability
We begin with showing polynomial-time solvability for the strongest restriction
that we consider in this paper: a single agent, single-pointed S5 models, and
no postconditions.
Proposition 1 The model checking problem for DEL with S5 models is poly-
nomial-time solvable when restricted to instances with a single agent and only
single-pointed event models without postconditions.
Proof We describe a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the problem. The
main idea behind this algorithm is the following. Even though the updates
might cause an exponential blow-up in the number of worlds in the model,
in this restricted setting, we only need to remember a small number of these
worlds.
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Concretely, since there is only a single agent a, and since there is only a
single designated world w0, we only need to remember the set of worlds that
are connected with an a-relation to the designated world w0. Moreover, among
these worlds, we can merge those with an identical valuation. Since the event
models contain no postconditions, this (contracted) set of worlds can only
decrease after updates, i.e., updates can only remove worlds from this set.
Formally, we can describe this argument as follows. Let (M, w0) be a single-
pointed S5 epistemic model with one agent, and let (E , e0) be a single-pointed
S5 event model with one agent and no postconditions. ThenM⊗E is bisimilar
to a submodel M′ of M, that is, to some M′ that can be obtained from M
by removing some worlds. Specifically, let W ′ be the set of worlds in M that
are a-accessible from w0, and let E
′ be the set of events in E that are a-
accessible from e0. Then, let W
′′ ⊆ W ′ be the subset of worlds that satisfy
the precondition of at least one e ∈ E′. One can straightforwardly verify
that (M⊗E , (w0, e0)) is bisimilar to the submodel (M′, w0) of (M, w0) induced
by W ′′. Moreover,M′ can be computed in polynomial time.
Using this property, we can construct a recursive algorithm to decide
whether M, w |= ϕ. We consider several cases. In the case where ϕ = p
for some p ∈ P , the problem can easily be solved in polynomial time, by
simply checking whether w ∈ V (p). In the case where ϕ = ¬ϕ1, we can re-
cursively call the algorithm to decide whether M, w |= ϕ1, and return the
opposite answer. Similarly, for ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, we can straightforwardly decide
whether M, w |= ϕ by first recursively determining whether M, w |= ϕ1 and
whether M, w |= ϕ2. In the case where ϕ = Kaϕ1, we firstly recursively deter-
mine whether M, w′ |= ϕ1 for each w′ ∈ W that is a-accessible from w. This
information immediately determines whether M, w |= Kaϕ1.
Finally, consider the case where ϕ = [E , e]ϕ1. In this case, we firstly re-
cursively decide whether M, w |= pre(e). If this is not the case, then triv-
ially, M, w |= ϕ. Otherwise, we construct the submodel M′ of M that is
bisimilar to M⊗E . This can be done as described above. In order to do this,
we need to decide which states in W ′ satisfy the precondition of some e′ ∈ E′,
where W ′ ⊆W and E′ ⊆ E are defined as explained above. This can be done
by recursive calls of the algorithm. Having determined W ′, and having con-
structedM′, we can now answer the question whether M, w |= [E , e]ϕ1 by us-
ing onlyM′, w and ϕ1. We know that w is a world inM′, sinceM, w |= pre(e).
Since M′ is bisimilar to M ⊗ E , it holds that M ⊗ E , (w, e) |= ϕ1 if and
only if M′, w |= ϕ1. Therefore, by recursively calling the algorithm to decide
whether M′, w |= ϕ1, we can decide whether M, w |= [E , e]ϕ1.
It is straightforward to verify that this recursive algorithm correctly decides
whether M, w |= ϕ. However, naively executing this recursive algorithm will,
in the worst case result in an exponential running time. This is because for the
case for ϕ = [E , e]ϕ1, the algorithm makes multiple (say b ≥ 2) recursive calls
for pre(e), and pre(e) could contain subformulas of the form [E ′, e′]ϕ′—which
in turn triggers multiple recursive calls for pre(e′) for each of the b branches
in the recursion tree, and so forth. As the number of these iterations can grow
linearly with the input size (say f(n)), the recursion tree can be of exponential
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size (namely, of size ≥ 2f(n)). We describe how to modify the algorithm to run
in polynomial time, using the technique of memoization. Whenever a recursive
call is made to decide whether N , u |= ψ, for some submodel N of M, some
world w in N , and some subformula ψ of ϕ, the result of this recursive call is
stored in a lookup table. Moreover, before making a recursive call to decide
whether N , u |= ψ, the lookup table is consulted, and if an answer is stored,
the algorithm uses this answer instead of executing the recursive call.
The number of submodels N ofM that need to be considered in the execu-
tion of the modified algorithm is upper bounded by the number of occurrences
of update operators [E , e] in the formula ϕ that is given as input to the problem.
Therefore, the size of the lookup table is polynomial in the input size. More-
over, computing the answer for any entry in the lookup table can be done
in polynomial time (using the answers for other entries in the lookup table).
Therefore, the modified algorithm decides whether M, w |= ϕ in polynomial
time. ⊓⊔
3.2 Hardness results for one agent
Next, we consider the restriction where we have a single agent and single-
pointed models, but where postconditions are allowed in the event models. In
this case, the problem is ∆p2-hard.
Theorem 1 The model checking problem for DEL with S5 models restricted
to instances with a single agent and only single-pointed models, but where event
models can contain postconditions, is ∆p2-hard.
Proof To show ∆p2-hardness, we give a polynomial-time reduction from the
problem of deciding whether the lexicographically maximal assignment that
satisfies a given propositional formula ϕ over variables x1, . . . , xn sets the vari-
able xn to true. Let ϕ be an instance of this problem, with variables x1, . . . , xn.
We construct a single-pointed epistemic model (M, w0) with a single agent a
and a DEL-formula χ whose updates consist of single-pointed event models
(that contain postconditions), such that M, w0 |= χ if and only if xn is true
in the lexicographically maximal assignment that satisfies ϕ.
In addition to the propositional variables x1, . . . , xn, we introduce a vari-
able z. Then, we construct the model (M, w0) as depicted in Figure 4.
z,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn ¬z,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn
a
Fig. 4: The epistemic model (M, w0), used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we introduce the single-pointed event model (Ei, ei)
as depicted in Figure 5. Intuitively, these updates will serve to generate, for
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each possible truth assignment α to the variables x1, . . . , xn, a world that
agrees with α (and that sets z to false), in addition to the designated world
(where z is true). We will denote the model resulting from updating (M, w0)
subsequently with the updates (E1, e1), . . . , (En, en) by (M′, w′).
〈z,⊤〉
〈¬z, xi〉 〈¬z,⊤〉
a
a
a
Fig. 5: The event model (Ei, ei), used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Next, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we introduce the single-pointed event model (E ′i , e
′
i)
as depicted in Figure 6. Intuitively, we will use the event models (E ′i , e
′
i) to
obtain (many copies of) the lexicographically maximal assignment that satis-
fies ϕ. Applying the update (E ′i , e
′
i) to (M
′, w′) will set the variable xi to true
in all worlds (that satisfy ¬z) if there is an assignment (among the remain-
ing assignments) that satisfies ϕ and that sets xi to true, and it will set the
variable xi to false in all worlds (that satisfy ¬z) otherwise. Then, after ap-
plying the updates (E ′1, e
′
1), . . . , (E
′
n, e
′
n) to (M
′, w′), all worlds in the resulting
model will have the same valuation—namely, a valuation that agrees with the
lexicographically maximal assignment that satisfies ϕ. In particular, the vari-
able xn is true in this valuation if and only if xn is true in the lexicographically
maximal assignment that satisfies ϕ.
〈z,⊤〉
〈¬z ∧ Kˆa(xi ∧ ϕ), xi〉 〈¬z ∧ ¬Kˆa(xi ∧ ϕ),¬xi〉
a
a
a
Fig. 6: The event model (E ′i, e
′
i), used in the proof of Theorem 1.
We then let χ = [E1, e1] . . . [En, en][E
′
1, e
′
1] . . . [E
′
n, e
′
n]Kˆaxn. We now formally
show that the lexicographically maximal assignment α0 that satisfies ϕ sets xn
to true if and only ifM, w0 |= χ. In order to do so, we will prove the following
claim. The model (M′′, w′′) = (M, w0)⊗ (E1, e1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (En, en)⊗ (E ′1, e
′
1) ⊗
· · · ⊗ (E ′n, e
′
n) consists of a world w
′′ that sets z to true and all other variables
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to false, and of worlds that set z to false and that agree with α0 on the
variables x1, . . . , xn. Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that (M′, w′) =
(M, w0) ⊗ (E1, e1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ (En, en) consists of the world w′ and exactly one
world corresponding to each truth assignment α to the variables x1, . . . , xn.
Then, applying the update (E ′1, e
′
1) to (M
′, w′) has two possible outcomes:
either (1) if there exists a model of ϕ that sets x1 to true, then in all worlds
(that set z to false) the variable x1 will be set to true; or (2) if there exists
no model of ϕ that sets x1 to true, then in all worlds (that set z to false) the
variable x1 will be set to false. For each 1 < i ≤ n, subsequently applying the
update (E ′i , e
′
i) has an entirely similar effect. By a straightforward inductive
argument, it then follows that all the worlds in (M′′, w′′) that set z to false
agree with the lexicographically maximal model of ϕ.
Therefore, M, w0 |= χ if and only if xn is true in the lexicographically
maximal model of ϕ, and we can conclude that the problem is ∆p2-hard. ⊓⊔
When we allow multi-pointed models, the problem turns out to be PSPACE-
hard, even when restricted to a single agent.
Theorem 2 The model checking problem for DEL with S5 models restricted
to instances with a single agent and no postconditions in the event models, but
where models can be multi-pointed, is PSPACE-hard.
Proof In order to show PSPACE-hardness, we give a polynomial-time reduc-
tion from the problem of deciding whether a quantified Boolean formula is true.
Let ϕ = ∃x1∀x2 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula, where ψ
is quantifier-free (we assume without loss of generality that n is even). We
construct a single-pointed epistemic model (M, w0) with one agent a and a
DEL-formula χ (containing updates with multi-pointed event models) such
that M, w0 |= χ if and only if ϕ is true.
The first main idea behind this reduction is that we represent truth as-
signments to the propositional variables x1, . . . , xn with connected groups of
worlds. Let α be a truth assignment to the variables x1, . . . , xn, and let xi1 , . . . , xiℓ
be the variables that α sets to true. We then represent α by means of a group
of worlds w0, w1, . . . , wℓ, where the world w0 makes no propositional variable
true, and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, world wj makes exactly one propositional vari-
able true (namely, xij ). These worlds w0, w1, . . . , wℓ are fully connected. This
collection of worlds w0, w1, . . . , wℓ is what we call the group of worlds corre-
sponding to α. Moreover, the designated state is w0. Consider the truth assign-
ment α = {x1 7→ 1, x2 7→ 1, x3 7→ 0, x4 7→ 1}, for example. In Figure 7 we show
the group of worlds that we use to represent this truth assignment α. We let
the modelM be the group of worlds corresponding to the truth assignment α0
that assigns all variables x1, . . . , xn to true.
The next main idea is that we represent existential and universal quan-
tification of the propositional variables using the dynamic operators 〈E , E〉
and [E , E], respectively. For each propositional variable xi in the quantified
Boolean formula, we introduce the multi-pointed event model (Ei, Ei) as de-
picted in Figure 8. We use the event models (E1, E1), . . . , (En, En), to create
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x1
x2 x4
a
a
a a
a
a
Fig. 7: The group of worlds that we use to represent the truth assignment α =
{x1 7→ 1, x2 7→ 1, x3 7→ 0, x4 7→ 1}, in the proof of Theorem 2.
(disconnected) groups of worlds (that all have a designated world) that corre-
spond to each possible truth assignment α to the variables x1, . . . , xn.
〈⊤,⊤〉 〈¬xi,⊤〉
Fig. 8: The multi-pointed event model (Ei, Ei) corresponding to variable xi,
used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Using the alternation of diamond dynamic operators and box dynamic
operators, we can simulate existential and universal quantification of vari-
ables in the formula ϕ. We simulate an existentially quantified variable ∃xi
by the dynamic operator 〈Ei, Ei〉—a formula of the form 〈Ei, Ei〉φ is true if
and only if 〈Ei, ei〉φ is true for some ei ∈ Ei. Similarly, we simulate a univer-
sally quantified variable ∀xi by the dynamic operator [Ei, Ei]—a formula of
the form [Ei, Ei]φ is true if and only [Ei, ei]φ is true for all ei ∈ Ei.
Concretely, we let χ = 〈E1, E1〉[E2, E2] . . . 〈En−1, En−1〉[En, En]χ′, where χ′
is the formula obtained from ψ by replacing each occurrence of a propositional
variable xi by the formula Kˆaxi.
We show that ϕ is a true quantified Boolean formula if and only ifM, w0 |=
χ. In order to do so, we prove the following statement, relating truth assign-
ments α to the variables x1, . . . , xn to groups of worlds containing a designated
world. The statement that we will prove inductively for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 is
the following.
Statement: Let α be any truth assignment to the variables x1, . . . , xn that sets
all variables xi, . . . , xn to true, and let α
′ be the restriction of α to the vari-
ables x1, . . . , xi−1. Moreover, let M be a group of worlds that corresponds to
the truth assignment α, containing a designated worldw. ThenQixi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ
is true under α′ if and only if:
– w makes 〈Ei, Ei〉 . . . [En, En]χ′ true, if i is odd; and
– w makes [Ei, Ei] . . . [En, En]χ′ true, if i is even.
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The statement for i = 1 implies that M, w0 |= χ if and only if ϕ is a true
quantified Boolean formula. We show that the statement holds for i = 1 by
showing that the statement holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1. We begin by showing
that the statement holds for i = n + 1. In this case, we know that α = α′
is a truth assignment to the variables x1, . . . , xn. Moreover, by construction
of χ′ we know that w makes χ′ true if and only if α satisfies ψ. Therefore, the
statement holds.
Next, we let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be arbitrary, and we assume that the statement
holds for i + 1. We now distinguish two cases: either (1) Qi = ∃, i.e., the i-th
quantifier of ϕ is existential, or (2) Qi = ∀, i.e., the i-th quantifier of ϕ is
universal.
First, consider case (1). Suppose that ∃xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′.
Then there exists a truth assignment α′′ to the variables x1, . . . , xi that agrees
with α′ on the variables x1, . . . , xi−1 and for which ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true
under α′′. Therefore, there exists some event e ∈ Ei such that the groupM ′ =
{ (v, e) : v ∈ M and M, v |= pre(e) } of worlds and the world w′ = (w, e), to-
gether with the assignment α′′′ that agrees with α′′ on the variables x1, . . . , xi
and that sets the variables xi+1, . . . , xn to true, satisfy the requirements for
the statement for i + 1. Then, by the induction hypothesis we know that w′
makes [Ei+1, Ei+1] . . . 〈En−1, En−1〉[En, En]χ′ true. Therefore, we can conclude
that w makes 〈Ei, Ei〉 . . . 〈En−1, En−1〉[En, En]χ′ true.
Conversely, suppose that w makes 〈Ei, Ei〉 . . . 〈En−1, En−1〉[En, En]χ′ true.
This can only be the case if there is some event e ∈ Ei such that the set M ′
and w′ (defined as above) correspond to a truth assignment α′′′ (also defined as
above). Then, by the induction hypothesis, we know that ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ
is true under α′′ (obtained from α′′′ as above). Therefore, since α′′ extends α′,
we can conclude that ∃xi . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′.
The argument for case (2) is entirely analogous (yet dual). We omit a de-
tailed treatment of this case. This concludes the inductive proof of the state-
ment for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, and thus concludes our proof that M, w0 |= χ if
and only if ϕ is true. ⊓⊔
3.3 Hardness results for two agents
Next, we show that when we consider the case of two agents, the model check-
ing problem for DEL is PSPACE-hard, even when we only allow single-pointed
models without postconditions.
Theorem 3 The model checking problem for DEL is PSPACE-hard, even
when restricted to the case where the question is whetherM, w0 |= [E1, e1] . . . [En, en]χ,
where:
– the model (M, w0) is a single-pointed S5 model;
– all the (Ei, ei) are single-pointed S5 event models without postconditions;
– χ is an epistemic formula without update modalities that contains (multiple
occurrences of) only three propositional variables; and
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– there are only two agents.
Proof In order to show PSPACE-hardness, we give a polynomial-time reduc-
tion from the problem of deciding whether a quantified Boolean formula is true.
Let ϕ = ∃x1∀x2 . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula, where ψ is
quantifier-free. We construct an epistemic model (M, w0) with two agents a, b
and a DEL-formula ξ such that M, w0 |= ξ if and only if ϕ is true.
The first main idea behind the reduction is that we use two propositional
variables, say z0 and z1, to represent an arbitrary number of propositions,
by creating chains of worlds that represent these propositions. Let x1, . . . , xn
be the propositions that we want to represent. Then we represent a proposi-
tion xj by a chain of worlds of length j + 1 that are connected alternatingly
by b-relations and a relations. In this chain, the last world is the only world
that makes z0 true. Moreover, the first world in the chain is the only world
that makes z1 true. An example of such a chain that we use to represent
proposition x3 can be found in Figure 9.
(w0)
z1 z0
b a b
Fig. 9: The chain of worlds that we use to represent proposition x3 in the proof
of Theorem 3. The first world in the chain is the world w0, that is depicted on
the left.
The next idea that plays an important role in the reduction is that we
will group together (the first worlds) of several such chains to represent a
truth assignment to the propositions x1, . . . , xn. Let α be a truth assignment
to the propositions x1, . . . , xn, and let xi1 , . . . , xiℓ be the propositions that α
sets to true (for 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iℓ ≤ n). Then we represent the truth as-
signment α in the following way. We take the chains corresponding to the
propositions xi1 , . . . , xiℓ , and we connect the first world (the world that is la-
belled with w0 in Figure 9) of each two of these chains with an a-relation. In
other words, we connect all these first worlds together in a fully connected
clique of a-relations. Moreover, to this a-clique of worlds, we add a designated
world where both z1 and a third propositional variable z2 are true. The collec-
tion of all worlds in the chains corresponding to the propositions xi1 , . . . , xiℓ
and this additional designated world is what we call the group of worlds rep-
resenting α. For the sake of convenience, we call the world where z1 and z2
are true the central world of the group of worlds. In Figure 10 we give an
example of such a group of worlds that we use to represent the truth assign-
ment α = {x1 7→ 1, x2 7→ 1, x3 7→ 0, x4 7→ 1}.
By using the expressivity of epistemic logic, we can construct formulas
that extract information from these representations of truth assignments. In-
tuitively, we can check whether a truth assignment α sets a proposition xj
On the Complexity of Model Checking for DEL with S5 Models 17
z1, z2
z1 z0
b
z1 z0
b a
z1 z0
b a b a
aa
a
a
a
a
Fig. 10: The group of worlds that we use to represent the truth assignment α =
{y1 7→ 1, y2 7→ 1, y3 7→ 0, y4 7→ 1} in the proof of Theorem 3.
to true by checking whether the group of worlds representing α contains a
chain of worlds of length exactly j + 1. Formally, we will define a formula χj
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which is true in the designated world if and only if the
group contains a chain representing proposition xj . We describe how to con-
struct the formulas χj . Firstly, we inductively define formulas χ
a
j and χ
b
j , for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ n as follows. Intuitively, the formula χaj is true in exactly those
worlds from which there is an alternating chain that ends in a z0-world, that is
of length at least j and that starts with an a-relation. Similarly, the formula χbj
is true in exactly those worlds from which there is an alternating chain that
ends in a z0-world, that is of length at least j, and that starts with a b-relation.
We let χa0 = χ
b
0 = z0, and for each j > 0, we let χ
b
j = Kˆb(¬z1 ∧ ¬z2 ∧ χ
a
j−1)
and χaj = Kˆa(¬z1∧¬z2∧χ
b
j−1). Now, using the formulas χ
b
j , we can define the
formulas χj . We let χj = z1 ∧ ¬z2 ∧ χbj ∧ ¬χ
b
j−1. As a result of this definition,
the formula χj is true in exactly those worlds that are the first world of a
chain of length exactly j.
For example, consider the formula χ2 = z1∧¬z2∧Kˆb(¬z1∧¬z2∧Kˆa(¬z1∧
¬z2 ∧ z0))∧¬Kˆb(¬z1 ∧¬z2 ∧ z0) and consider the group of worlds depicted in
Figure 10. This formula is true only in the first world of the chain of length 2.
The epistemic model (M, w0) that we use in the reduction is based on the
modelMα0 representing the truth assignment α0 : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} that
sets all propositions x1, . . . , xn to true. To obtainM, we will add a number of
additional worlds to the modelMα0 , that we will use to simulate the behavior
of the existential and universal quantifiers in the DEL-formula χ that we will
construct below. Specifically, we will add alternating chains of worlds to the
model that are similar to the chains that represent the propositions x1, . . . , xn.
However, the additional chains that we add differ in two aspects from the
chains that represent the propositions x1, . . . , xn: (1) the additional chains
start with an a-relation instead of starting with a b-relation, and (2) in the
first world of the additional chains, the propositional variable z2 is true instead
of the variable z1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add such an additional chain of
length i, and we connect the first worlds of these additional chains, together
with the designated world, in a clique of b-relations. To illustrate this, the
18 Ronald de Haan, Iris van de Pol
model (M, w0) that results from this construction is shown in Figure 11, for the
case where n = 3. For the sake of convenience, we will denote these additional
chains by z2-chains, and the chains that represent the propositions x1, . . . , xn
by z1-chains (after the propositional variables that are true in the first worlds
of these chains).
To check whether an alternating chain of length exactly j, that starts from
a z2-world with an a-relation, is present in the model, we define formulas χ
′
j
similarly to the way we defined the formulas χj . Specifically, we let χ
′
j =
¬z1 ∧ z2 ∧ χ
a
j ∧ ¬χ
a
j−1.
We will use the z2-chains together with the formulas χ
′
j to keep track of
an additional counter. We will use this counter as a technical trick to imple-
ment the simulation of existentially and universally quantified variables in the
formula ϕ.
z1 z0
b
z1 z0
b a
z1 z0
b a b
aa
a
z1, z2
a
a
a
z2
z2
z2
b
b
b
b
b
b
z0
a
z0
ab
z1z0
aba
Fig. 11: The epistemic model (M, w0) for the case where n = 3, as used in the
proof of Theorem 3.
Next, we describe how we can generate all possible truth assignments over
the variables x1, . . . , xn from the initial model M. We do this in such a way
that we can afterwards express the existential and universal quantifications
of the formula ϕ using modal operators in the epistemic language. In order
to generate groups of worlds that represent truth assignments α that differ
from the all-ones assignment α0, we will apply updates that copy the existing
worlds but that eliminate (the first worlds of) chains of a certain length. This
is the third main idea behind this reduction.
Specifically, we will introduce a single-pointed event model (Ei, ei) for each
propositional variable xi, that is depicted in Figure 12. Intuitively, what hap-
pens when the update (Ei, ei) is applied is the following. All existing groups
of worlds will be duplicated, resulting in five copies—this corresponds to the
five events f1i , . . . , f
5
i in the event model. The resulting groups of worlds will
be connected corresponding to the relations between the events in the event
model. That is, for any existing group of worlds, three of its copies (correspond-
ing to the events f1i , f
2
i , and f
3
i ) will be connected by b-relations. The second
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and third of these copies (the ones corresponding to the events f2i and f
3
i )
will be connected by a-relations to the fourth and fifth copy (corresponding
to the events f4i and f
5
i ), respectively. Moreover, in the fourth and fifth copy,
(the first world of) the z2-chain of length i is removed, and in the fifth copy,
(the first world of) the z1-chain of length i is removed as well. These effects of
removing (the first worlds of) chains is enforced by the preconditions of the
events in the event model.
(f1i = ei)
〈⊤,⊤〉
(f2i )
〈⊤,⊤〉
(f3i )
〈⊤,⊤〉
(f4i )
〈¬χ′i,⊤〉
(f5i )
〈¬χ′i ∧ ¬χi,⊤〉
b b
b
a a
Fig. 12: The event model (Ei, ei) corresponding to the propositional variable xi,
used in the proof of Theorem 3. The events are labelled f1i , . . . , f
5
i .
By applying the updates (E1, e1), . . . , (En, en), we generate many (in fact,
an exponential number of) copies of the model M, in each of which certain
chains of worlds are removed, and which are connected to each other by means
of a-relations and b-relations in the way described in the previous paragraph.
In particular, for each truth assignment α to the propositions x1, . . . , xn, there
is some group of worlds that corresponds to α.
Finally, we construct the DEL-formula ξ. We let ξ = [E1, e1] . . . [En, en]ξ1,
where we define ξ1 below. The formula ξ1 exploits the structure of the epistemic
model M′, that results from updating the model M with the updates (Ei, ei),
to simulate the semantics of the quantified Boolean formula ϕ. For each 1 ≤
i ≤ n+ 1, we define ξi inductively as follows:
ξi =


ψ′ if i = n+ 1,
KˆbKˆa(z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n
Kˆbχ
′
j ∧ ξi+1) for odd i ≤ n,
KbKa((z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n
Kˆbχ
′
j)→ ξi+1) for even i ≤ n.
Here, ψ′ is the formula obtained from ψ (the quantifier-free part of the quan-
tified Boolean formula ϕ) by replacing each occurrence of a propositional vari-
able xi by the formula Kˆaχi.
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We use the formulas ξi to express the formula ϕ with its existentially and
universally quantified variables. Intuitively, the formulas ξi navigate through
the groups of worlds in the model M′—resulting from updating M with the
event models (Ei, ei)—as follows. Consider the central world of some group
of worlds in the model M′, and consider the formula ξi for some odd i ≤ n.
For ξi to be true in this world, the formula ξi+1 needs to be true in the central
world of some group of worlds that corresponds to one of the events f4i or f
5
i
from the event model (Ei, ei). Similarly, for the formula ξi to be true in this
world, for even i ≤ n, the formula ξi+1 needs to be true in the central world
of both groups of worlds that correspond to the events f4i and f
5
i . In this way,
for odd i ≤ n, the formula ξi together with the event model (Ei, ei) serves to
simulate an existential choice of a truth value for the variable xi. Similarly,
for even i ≤ n, the formula ξi together with the event model (Ei, ei) serves to
simulate a universal choice of a truth value for the variable xi.
The model (M, w0) and the formula ξ can be constructed in polynomial
time in the size of the quantified Boolean formula ϕ. Furthermore, in the
constructed instance, there are only two agents, the epistemic model (M, w0) is
a single-pointed S5 model, all event models (Ei, ei) are single-pointed S5 models
without postconditions, and ξ1 is a formula without update modalities that
contains (many occurrences of) only three propositional variables z0, z1, z2.
We show that ϕ is a true quantified Boolean formula if and only ifM, w0 |=
ξ. In order to do so, we prove the following (technical) statement relating truth
assignments α to the propositions x1, . . . , xn and (particular) worlds w in the
epistemic model (M′, w′0) = (M, w0) ⊗ (E1, e1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ (En, en). Before we
give the statement that we will prove, we observe that every world w that
sets both z1 and z2 to true is the central world of some group of worlds that
represents a truth assignment α to the propositions x1, . . . , xn. For the sake of
convenience, we will say that w corresponds to the truth assignment α. The
statement that we will prove for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 is the following.
Statement: Let α be any truth assignment to the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1.
Moreover, let w be any world in the model (M′, w′0) such that:
1. w makes z1 and z2 true,
2. w makes Kˆbχ
′
j false for all 1 ≤ j < i,
3. w makes Kˆbχ
′
j true for all i ≤ j ≤ n, and
4. the truth assignment corresponding to w agrees with α on the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi−1.
Then the (partially) quantified Boolean formula Qixi . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true
under α if and only if w makes ξi true.
Observe that for i = 1, the world w′0 satisfies all four conditions. Therefore,
the statement for i = 1 implies that M, w0 |= ξ if and only if ϕ is a true
quantified Boolean formula. Thus, proving this statement for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1
suffices to show the correctness of our reduction.
We begin by showing that the statement holds for i = n + 1. In this
case, we know that α is a truth assignment to the propositions x1, . . . , xn.
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Moreover, ξn+1 = ψ
′. By construction of ψ′, we know that w makes ψ′ true if
and only if α satisfies ψ. Therefore, the statement holds for i = n+ 1.
Next, we let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be arbitrary, and we assume that the statement
holds for i + 1. That is, the statement holds for every combination of a truth
assignment α and a world w that satisfies the conditions. Since w is a world
in the model (M, w0)⊗ (E1, e1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (En, en), and since w makes z1 and z2
true, we know that w = (w0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
n), for some e
′
1, . . . , e
′
n, where e
′
j ∈ Ej for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We know that w makes Kˆbχ′j true for all i ≤ j ≤ n. Therefore,
we know that for each i ≤ j ≤ n it holds that e′j ∈ {f
1
j , f
2
j , f
3
j }.
We now distinguish two cases: either (1) i is odd, or (2) i is even. In
case (1), the i-th quantifier of ϕ is existential, and in case (2), the i-th quanti-
fier of ϕ is universal. First, consider case (1). Suppose that ∃xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ
is true under α. Then there exists some truth assignment α′ to the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi that agrees with α on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1 and that
ensures that ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′. Suppose that α′(xi) = 0;
the case for α′(xi) = 1 is entirely similar. Now, consider the worlds w
′ =
(w0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
i−1, f
3
i , e
′
i+1, . . . , e
′
n) and w
′′ = (w0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
i−1, f
5
i , e
′
i+1, . . . , e
′
n).
By the construction of (Ei, ei), by the semantics of product update, and by
the fact that e′i ∈ {f
1
i , f
2
i , f
3
i }, it holds that (w,w
′) ∈ Rb and (w′, w′′) ∈ Ra.
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that w′′ satisfies conditions (1)–(4),
for the truth assignment α′. Also, we know that ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true
under α′. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we know that w′′ makes the
formula ξi+1 true. It then follows from the definition of ξi that w
′ and w′′
witness that w makes ξi true.
Conversely, suppose that w makes ξi true. Moreover, suppose that w
′
and w′′ (as defined above) witness this. (The only other possible worlds u′
and u′′ that could witness this are obtained from w by replacing e′i by f
2
i
and f4i , respectively. The case where u
′ and u′′ witness that w makes ξi true
is entirely similar.) This means that w′′ makes ξi+1 true. Then, by the in-
duction hypothesis, it follows that the truth assignment α′ to the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi corresponding to the world w
′′ satisfies ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ.
Moreover, since α′ agrees with α on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1, it follows
that ∃xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α.
Next, consider case (2). Suppose that ∀xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true un-
der α. Then for both truth assignments α′ to the variables x1, . . . , xi that
agree with α it holds that ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′. The
only worlds that satisfy (z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) and that
are accessible from w by a b-relation followed by an a-relation are the
worlds u1 and u2, where u1 = (w0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
i−1, f
4
i , e
′
i+1, . . . , e
′
n) and u2 =
(w0, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
i−1, f
5
i , e
′
i+1, . . . , e
′
n). Moreover, the truth assignments α1 and α2
that correspond to u1 and u2, respectively, agree with α on the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi−1. Because ∀xi . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α, we know
that ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under both α1 and α2. Then, by the induc-
tion hypothesis it follows that both u1 and u2 make ξi+1 true. Therefore, w
makes ξi true.
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Conversely, suppose that w makes ξi true. By the definition of ξi, we then
know that all worlds that are accessible from w by a b-relation followed by
an a-relation and that make (z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) true,
also make ξi+1 true. Consider the worlds u1 and u2, as defined above. These
are both accessible from w by a b-relation followed by an a-relation, and they
make (z1∧z2∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) true. Therefore, both u1 and u2
make ξi+1 true. Also, the truth assignments α1 and α2 that correspond to u1
and u2, respectively, agree with α on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1. Moreover,
the truth assignments α1 and α2 are both possible truth assignments to the
propositions x1, . . . , xi that agree with α. By the induction hypothesis, the
formula ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under both α1 and α2. Therefore, we
can conclude that ∀xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α.
This concludes the inductive proof of the statement for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1,
and thus concludes our correctness proof. Therefore, we can conclude that the
problem is PSPACE-hard. ⊓⊔
4 Results for semi-private announcements
Next, we consider the model checking problem for DEL when restricted to
updates that are semi-private announcements. In fact, PSPACE-hardness for
the setting with semi-private announcements (rather than allowing arbitrary
event models) already follows from a recent PSPACE-hardness proof for a
restricted variant of the model checking problem [23, Theorem 4]. In this
PSPACE-hardness result, the number of agents is unbounded, i.e., the number
of agents is part of the problem input. We show that the problem is already
PSPACE-hard when the number of agents is bounded by a constant k ≥ 2.
Theorem 4 is a stronger result than Theorem 3—Theorem 4 implies the
result of Theorem 3.We presented the proof of Theorem 3 in full detail, because
it allows us to explain the proof of Theorem 4 in a clear way.
Theorem 4 The model checking problem for DEL is PSPACE-hard, even
when restricted to the case where the question is whetherM, w0 |= [E1, e1] . . . [En, en]χ,
where:
– the model (M, w0) is a single-pointed S5 model;
– all the (Ei, ei) are (single-pointed) semi-private announcements;
– χ is an epistemic formula without update modalities that contains (multiple
occurrences of) only three propositional variables; and
– there are only two agents.
Proof We modify the proof of Theorem 3 to work also for the case of semi-
private announcements. Most prominently, we will replace the event mod-
els (Ei, ei) that are used in the proof of Theorem 3 (shown in Figure 12) by
a number of event models for semi-private announcements. Intuitively, these
semi-private announcements will take the role of the event models (Ei, ei). In
order to make this work, we will also slightly change the initial model M.
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As in the proof of Theorem 3, we give a polynomial-time reduction from
the problem of deciding whether a quantified Boolean formula is true. Let ϕ =
∃x1∀x2 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula, where ψ is quantifier-
free. We construct an epistemic model (M, w0) with two agents a, b and a
DEL-formula ξ such that M, w0 |= ξ if and only if ϕ is true.
In the proof of Theorem 3, the initial modelM consisted of a central world
(where z1 and z2 are true), a number of z1-chains (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is
a z1-chain of length i), and a number of z2-chains (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there
is a z2-chain of length i)—and these worlds are connected by a-relations and
b-relations as shown in Figure 11. To obtain the initial model M that we use
in this proof, we add additional z2-chains. Specifically, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n, we
will have a z2-chain of length i. These additional z2-chains are connected to the
central world in exactly the same way as the original z2-chains (that is, all the
first worlds of the z2-chains are connected in a b-clique to the central world).
We will use these additional z2-chains to simulate the behavior of the event
models (Ei, ei) from the proof of Theorem 3 with event models corresponding
to semi-private announcements. The number of z1-chains remains the same.
The designated world w0 is the central world (that is, the only world that
makes both z1 and z2 true), as in the proof of Theorem 3.
(f1i )
〈¬χ′i+n,⊤〉
(f2i )
〈¬χ′i+2n,⊤〉
b
(a) The semi-private announcement (E1i , f
1
i )
(f3i )
〈⊤,⊤〉
(f4i )
〈(¬Kˆbχ
′
i+n ∧ z2) → ¬χ
′
i,⊤〉
a
(b) The semi-private announcement (E2i , f
3
i )
(f5i )
〈⊤,⊤〉
(f6i )
〈((¬Kˆbχ
′
i+2n ∧ z2) → ¬χ
′
i) ∧
((¬KˆaKˆbχ
′
i+2n ∧ z1) → ¬χi),⊤〉
a
(c) The semi-private announcement (E3i , f
5
i )
Fig. 13: The semi-private announcements (E1i , f
1
i ), (E
2
i , f
3
i ) and (E
3
i , f
5
i ) used
in the proof of Theorem 4.
The event models (Ei, ei) that are used in the proof of Theorem 3 we replace
by the semi-private announcements (E1i , f
1
i ), (E
2
i , f
3
i ), and (E
3
i , f
5
i ), as shown
in Figure 13. The intuition behind these updates is the following. Firstly, the
semi-private announcement E1i , shown in Figure 13a, transforms every group
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of worlds into two copies, and allows a choice between these two copies when
following a b-relation. Moreover, in one copy, every (first world of the) z2-chain
of length i + n is removed, and in the other copy, every (first world of the)
z2-chain of length i+2n is removed. In other words, the choice between these
two copies determines whether the formula Kˆbχ
′
i+n or the formula Kˆbχ
′
i+2n
is false in the central world. Then for every group of worlds that does not
include a z2-chain of length i + n, the semi-private announcement E2i , shown
in Figure 13b, creates an a-accessible copy where the z2-chain of length i is
removed. Similarly, for every group of worlds that does not include a z2-chain of
length i+2n, the semi-private announcement E3i , shown in Figure 13c, creates
an a-accessible copy where both the z2-chain of length i and the z1-chain of
length i are removed.
Next, we construct the DEL-formula ξ. We let ξ = [E11 , f
1
1 ][E
2
1 , f
3
1 ][E
3
1 , f
5
1 ] . . .
[E1n, f
1
n][E
2
n, f
3
n][E
3
n, f
5
n]ξ1, where ξ1 is defined as follows, similarly to the defini-
tion used in the proof of Theorem 3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, we define ξi
inductively as follows:
ξi =


ψ′ if i = n+ 1,
Kˆb(
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧ Kˆa(z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n
Kˆbχ
′
j ∧ ξi+1)) for odd i ≤ n,
Kb((
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j)→ Ka((z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i
¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n
Kˆbχ
′
j)→ ξi+1)) for even i ≤ n.
Here, ψ′ is the formula obtained from ψ (the quantifier-free part of the quan-
tified Boolean formula ϕ) by replacing each occurrence of a propositional vari-
able xi by the formula Kˆaχi.
The formulas ξi that we defined above are very similar to their coun-
terparts in the proof of Theorem 3—and the idea behind their use in the
proof is entirely the same as in the proof of Theorem 3. The only differ-
ence is the addition of the subformulas
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j after the first modal
operator. These additional subformulas are needed to ensure that some addi-
tional worlds—that are a by-product of the combination of the semi-private
announcements (E1i , f
1
i ), (E
2
i , f
3
i ), and (E
3
i , f
5
i )—do not interfere in the reduc-
tion.
We show that ϕ is a true quantified Boolean formula if and only ifM, w0 |=
ξ. In order to do so, as in the proof of Theorem 3, we prove the following (techni-
cal) statement relating truth assignments α to the propositions x1, . . . , xn and
(particular) worlds w in the epistemic model (M′, w′0) = (M, w0)⊗ (E
1
1 , f
1
1 )⊗
· · · ⊗ (E3n, f
5
n). Before we give the statement that we will prove, we observe
that every world w that sets both z1 and z2 to true is the central world of
some group of worlds that represents a truth assignment α to the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xn. For the sake of convenience, we will say that w corresponds
to the truth assignment α. The statement that we will prove for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1
is the following.
Statement: Let α be any truth assignment to the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1.
Moreover, let w be any world in the model (M′, w′0) such that:
On the Complexity of Model Checking for DEL with S5 Models 25
1. w makes z1 and z2 true,
2. w makes Kˆbχ
′
j false for all 1 ≤ j < i,
3. w makes Kˆbχ
′
j true for all i ≤ j ≤ n, and
4. the truth assignment corresponding to w agrees with α on the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi−1.
Then the (partially) quantified Boolean formula Qixi . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true
under α if and only if w makes ξi true.
Observe that for i = 1, the world w′0 satisfies all four conditions. Therefore,
the statement for i = 1 implies that M, w0 |= ξ if and only if ϕ is a true
quantified Boolean formula. Thus, proving this statement for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1
suffices to show the correctness of our reduction.
We begin by showing that the statement holds for i = n + 1. In this
case, we know that α is a truth assignment to the propositions x1, . . . , xn.
Moreover, ξn+1 = ψ
′. By construction of ψ′, we know that w makes ψ′ true if
and only if α satisfies ψ. Therefore, the statement holds for i = n+ 1.
Next, we let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be arbitrary, and we assume that the statement
holds for i+1. That is, the statement holds for every combination of a truth as-
signment α and a world w that satisfies the conditions. Since w is a world in the
model (M, w0)⊗(E11 , f
1
1 )⊗· · ·⊗(E
3
n, f
5
n), and since w makes z1 and z2 true, we
know that w = (w0, g1, g
′
1, g
′′
1 , . . . , gn, g
′
n, g
′′
n), for some g1, g
′
1, g
′′
1 , . . . , gn, g
′
n, g
′′
n,
where for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, it holds that gj ∈ {f1j , f
2
j }, g
′
j ∈ {f
3
j , f
4
j },
and g′′j ∈ {f
5
j , f
6
j }.
We now distinguish two cases: either (1) i is odd, or (2) i is even. In
case (1), the i-th quantifier of ϕ is existential, and in case (2), the i-th quanti-
fier of ϕ is universal. First, consider case (1). Suppose that ∃xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ
is true under α. Then there exists some truth assignment α′ to the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi that agrees with α on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1 and that
ensures that ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′. Suppose that α′(xi) = 0;
the case for α′(xi) = 1 is entirely similar. Now, consider the worlds w
′ =
(w0, g1, . . . , g
′′
i−1, f
2
i , g
′
i, g
′′
i , gi+1, . . . , g
′′
n) and w
′′ = (w0, g1, . . . , g
′′
i−1, f
2
i , g
′
i, f
6
i ,
gi+1, . . . , g
′′
n) By the construction of E
1
i , E
2
i , and E
3
i , and by the semantics
of product update, it holds that (w,w′) ∈ Rb and (w′, w′′) ∈ Ra. Also, we
know that w′ makes
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j true. Moreover, it is straightforward to
verify that w′′ satisfies conditions (1)–(4), for the truth assignment α′. Also,
we know that ∀xi+1 . . .∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′. Therefore, by the induc-
tion hypothesis, we know that w′′ makes the formula ξi+1 true. It then follows
from the definition of ξi that w
′ and w′′ witness that w makes ξi true.
Conversely, suppose that w makes ξi true. Moreover, suppose that w
′
and w′′ (as defined above) witness this. It could also be the case that the
worlds u′ and u′′ witness this, which are obtained from w by replacing gi
by f1i , and by replacing gi by f
1
i and g
′
i by f
4
i , respectively. The case where u
′
and u′′ witness that w makes ξi true is entirely similar. (There are also vari-
ants of w′ and w′′, and of u′ and u′′, that could witness the fact that w
makes ξi true. These variants can be obtained by replacing gj , g
′
j , and g
′′
j—
for i < j ≤ n—ensuring that for all i < j ≤ n it holds that neither (1) gj = f1j
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and g′j = f
4
j nor (2) gj = f
2
j and g
′′
j = f
6
j . The following argument is entirely
similar for these variants. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the worlds w′
and w′′.) The assumption that w′ and w′′ witness that w makes ξi true implies
that w′ makes
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j true and that w
′′ makes ξi+1 true. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, it follows that the truth assignment α′ to the proposi-
tions x1, . . . , xi corresponding to the world w
′′ satisfies ∀xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ.
Moreover, since α′ agrees with α on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1, it follows
that ∃xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α.
Next, consider case (2). Suppose that ∀xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α.
Then for both truth assignments α′ to the variables x1, . . . , xi that agree with α
it holds that ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α′. We need to look at those
worlds that satisfy (z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) and that are
accessible from w by a b-relation followed by an a-relation (where the interme-
diate world makes
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j true). For our argument, it suffices to look
at the worlds u1 and u2, where u1 = (w0, g1, . . . , g
′′
i−1, f
1
i , f
4
i , g
′′
i , gi+1, . . . , g
′′
n)
and w′′ = (w0, g1, . . . , g
′′
i−1, f
2
i , g
′
i, f
6
i , gi+1, . . . , g
′′
n). (As in the argument for
case (1) above, there are variants of these worlds that also satisfy the require-
ments. The argument for these variants is entirely similar, and therefore we
restrict our attention to the worlds u1 and u2.) The truth assignments α1
and α2 that correspond to u1 and u2, respectively, agree with α on the propo-
sitions x1, . . . , xi−1. Because ∀xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under α, we know
that ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true under both α1 and α2. Then, by the induc-
tion hypothesis it follows that both u1 and u2 make ξi+1 true. Therefore, w
makes ξi true.
Conversely, suppose that w makes ξi true. By the definition of ξi, we then
know that all worlds that are accessible from w by a b-relation followed by
an a-relation and that make (z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧
∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) true
(where the intermediate world makes
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j true), also make ξi+1
true. Consider the worlds u1 and u2, as defined above. These are both acces-
sible from w by a b-relation followed by an a-relation (where the intermediate
world makes
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j true), and they make (z1 ∧ z2 ∧
∧
1≤j≤i ¬Kˆbχ
′
j ∧∧
i<j≤n Kˆbχ
′
j) true. Therefore, both u1 and u2 make ξi+1 true. Also, the truth
assignments α1 and α2 that correspond to u1 and u2, respectively, agree with α
on the propositions x1, . . . , xi−1. Moreover, the truth assignments α1 and α2
are both possible truth assignments to the propositions x1, . . . , xi that agree
with α. By the induction hypothesis, the formula ∃xi+1 . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is true
under both α1 and α2. Therefore, we can conclude that ∀xi . . . ∃xn−1∀xn.ψ is
true under α.
This concludes the inductive proof of the statement for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1,
and thus concludes our correctness proof. Therefore, we can conclude that the
problem is PSPACE-hard. ⊓⊔
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5 Conclusion
We extended known complexity results for the model checking problem for
DEL with a detailed computational complexity analysis. In particular, we
studied various restrictions of the problem where all models are S5, including
bounds on the number of agents, allowing only single-pointed models, allow-
ing no postconditions, and allowing semi-private announcements rather than
updates with arbitrary event models. We showed that the problem is already
PSPACE-hard for very restricted settings.
Future research includes extending the computational complexity analysis
to additional restricted settings. For instance, it would be interesting to see
whether the polynomial-time algorithm for Proposition 1 can be extended
to the setting where the models contain only relations that are transitive,
Euclidean and serial (KD45 models). In the setting of KD45 models, it would
also be interesting to investigate the complexity of the problem for the case
where all updates are private announcements (i.e., a public announcement to a
subset of agents, where the remaining agents have no awareness that any action
has taken place). Moreover, future research includes obtaining upper bounds
for the case where we only found lower bounds (i.e., for the case of one agent,
a single-pointed models, and single-pointed event models with postconditions,
where we showed ∆p2-hardness).
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